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Entry
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Abstract
This paper develops a structural empirical general equilibrium model
of aggregate bilateral trade with path dependence of country-pair level ex-
porter status. Such path dependence is motivated through informational
costs about serving a foreign market for ﬁrst-time entry of (ﬁrms in) an ex-
port market versus continued export services to that market. We embed the
theoretical model into a structural dynamic stochastic econometric model of
bilateral selection into import markets and apply it to a data-set of aggregate
bilateral exports among 120 countries over the period 1995-2004. In partic-
ular, we disentangle the role of changes in trade costs, in labor endowments,
and in total factor productivity for trade, bilateral market entry, numbers
of ﬁrms active, and welfare. Dynamic gains from trade diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from static ones, and path-dependence in market entry cushions eﬀects of
impulses in fundamental variables that are detrimental to bilateral trade.
Keywords: Bilateral trade ﬂows; Gravity equation; Dynamic random eﬀects
model; Sample selection
JEL codes: F10; F12; F17
∗Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, ETH Zurich, WEH E6,
Weinbergstrasse 35, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland. Co-aﬃliations: CEPR, CESifo, GEP, and
WIFO.
∗∗Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15, 6020 Inns-
bruck, Austria. Co-aﬃliations: CESifo and WIFO.
Acknowldgements: The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from FIW. Comments
at seminar presentations at the Universities of Basel, Freiburg, G¨ ottingen, Lausanne,
Mannheim, Pablo de Olavide at Sevilla, Syracuse, and T¨ ubingen are gratefully acknowl-
edged. Furthermore, we received useful comments at the annual meeting of the European
Trade Study Group, the annual CESifo Global Economy Area Conference, the PEGGED
Workshop at Villars, and the annual meeting of the Royal Economic Society. Especially,
we thank Costas Arkolakis, Harald Badinger, Richard Baldwin, Jﬀrey Bergstrand, Bernd
Fitzenberger, Piyusha Matreja, Marcelo Olarreaga, and Raymond Riezman for numerous
useful comments on earlier drafts.
11 Introduction
Whether two countries trade with each other in a given year or not – often
referred to as the extensive country margin of bilateral trade – can be ex-
plained with great success by their past export status. For a cross section of
the major 120 countries in terms of their GDP over the time period 1995-
2004, Table 1 suggests that 66% of the country-pairs display positive bilateral
exports when they did so 3 years prior to that, 20% have zero exports when
they did not have any exports 3 years prior to that, and 13% change their
activity within 3 years on average. Moreover, 52% of the country-pairs have
positive bilateral exports in 2004 and they did so in 1995, 20% report zero
exports in 2004 and they did not have any exports in 1995, and 28% change
their activity between 1995 and 2004. This evidence suggests that there is
a strong role for persistence or path dependence to play both unconditional
and, as we will show, conditional on exogenous determinants for the extensive
margin of trade.
This paper delivers a structural empirical model which is capable of an-
alyzing both the extensive and the intensive margin of aggregate bilateral
goods trade with a path-dependent extensive margin of trade (e.g., due to
learning of ﬁrms about ﬁxed market entry costs) in general equilibrium. In
particular, the work by Evenett and Venables (2002), Albornoz, Calvo Pardo,
Corcos, and Ornelas (2010), and others points to such path dependence at
the extensive margin of trade. The model we propose is based on a dynamic
model for bilateral selection into export markets and a demand equation
for bilateral goods exports which are interrelated through the determinis-
tic and stochastic components of the data-generating process. This model
fully respects general equilibrium constraints at both margins of trade and,
unlike earlier work, pursues an iterated estimation of a general-equilibrium-
2consistent panel data model with dynamic selection into export markets.
– Table 1 –
By virtue of the chosen approach, the paper stands on the shoulders of
previous research on structural modeling of bilateral trade ﬂows. With the
seminal papers of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), it became possible
to infer empirically comparative static eﬀects of determinants of bilateral
trade ﬂows which are consistent with general equilibrium, taking into account
repercussions of changes of exogenous drivers of trade on endogenous product
and, eventually, factor prices. Beyond earlier work, the structural models of
Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) can
explain zero trade ﬂows and, hence, deliver answers to the question as to
which extent trade responds to changes in fundamental variables through
the extensive versus the intensive margins of bilateral trade.1
A key feature of the aforementioned general equilibrium models is that
they are designed for empirical cross-section analysis. Hence, they do not
distinguish between short-run and long-run responses of outcome to changes
in fundamental variables. In principal, it is of course possible with such
models to simply index endogenous and exogenous variables by time and
analyze empirically a series of cross sections. Yet, there is no salient role
for history to play in the sense that, conditional on the contemporaneous
exogenous variables, those cross sections would be independent of each other.
Hence, such theoretical work suggests that the analysis of panel data on
1This paper is mostly concerned with path dependence in the entry of markets at the
aggregate bilateral level. Hence, it is only loosely related to recent work on the (static)
determinants and eﬀects of growth of product variety in new trade theory models along
the lines of Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Feenstra and Kee (2008).
3bilateral trade matrices can be performed for each period separately without
any loss of insight.
In line with recent structural empirical work on aggregate bilateral trade
ﬂows, we model nominal bilateral goods trade as a function of an exporting
country’s supply potential, an importing country’s demand potential, and
trade barriers. As in Melitz (2003), Chaney (2005), or Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008), the latter contain elements which are tied to the
quantity of goods shipped (variable trade costs) and ones that entail ﬁxed
export market access costs (ﬁxed trade costs). Apart from contemporaneous
fundamentals, we allow the extensive margin of bilateral trade to depend on
bilateral export status prior to a given point in time. For instance, this is
consistent with ﬁrms’ entering a market to generate information about that
market as a public good which is available to suppliers from the same origin
to that market in subsequent periods. This leads to a dynamic model of
export market selection which is stochastically related to export demand at
the intensive country margin.
We formulate a deterministic and a stochastic version of that model and
apply it to data on bilateral aggregate exports of the aforementioned 120
countries in three-year intervals between 1995 and 2004. Our goal is to iden-
tify the main drivers of world trade for that period, which in the context
of the model are (ﬁxed and variable) trade costs, labor endowments, and
productivity.2 In particular, we shed light on the short-run and the long-run
2In a diﬀerent context, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) have asked a related question in
a non-structural model with tariﬀs, non-tariﬀ trade costs, and GDP growth as the main
drivers of trade in a static model. They found that 67% of total growth of trade ﬂows for
16 OECD countries over 1958-1960 and 1986-1988 could be explained by GDP growth,
26% by tariﬀ reductions, and 8% by changes in non-tariﬀ trade costs. Hence, the lion’s
share is attributed to GDP growth, the latter being exogenous there but endogenous in
general equilibrium models of trade and itself a function of tariﬀs and trade costs among
other factors (such as total factor productivity and factor endowments). More recently,
Anderson and Baier (2010) focus on comparative static eﬀects of the main drivers of trade
4responses – and, hence, of path-dependence – of trade in general equilibrium
to the changes of these fundamentals. We do so in a fully nonlinear model.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the average three-year change in (ﬁxed and vari-
able) trade costs – a reduction thereof – per country-pair between 1995 and
2004 triggered positive short-run and long-run eﬀects on nominal bilateral
exports. Increases in labor endowments and total factor productivity raised
bilateral exports even more strongly in both the short run and the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
formulates a parsimonious endowment model with path-dependent export
market entry. While we chose a model which is closest to Krugman’s (1979),
such a framework could easily be cast in the context of theoretical models ` a
la Anderson (1979), Eaton and Kortum (2002), or Helpman, Melitz, and Ru-
binstein (2008). Section 3 embeds this model in a stochastic framework for
dynamic selection into export markets and aggregate export demand. Also,
that section provides details about the implementation of such a model for
parameter estimation and counterfactual analysis. Section 4 describes fea-
tures of the data-set of 120 countries and three-year intervals for 1995-2004
we apply this model to, and it summarizes estimation results. Section 5 de-
scribes the ﬁndings about the short-run (three-year) and long-run (thirteen-
year) eﬀects of changes in drivers of trade ﬂows as observed over the period
1995-2004. The last section concludes with a summary of the most important
ﬁndings.
in a static general equilibrium model with positive trade ﬂows only.
52 An aggregate gravity model with path-dependent
market entry
Consider a world with J countries indexed by j = 1,...,J and consumers
with a love for variety for goods consumption in a single sector ` a la Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977). It will be useful to introduce a time index and set out
that model for two periods, say t and t − 1. It suﬃces to focus mostly on
the exposition of the model for period t, but, as will become clear below, the
equilibrium in t will depend on export status (of ﬁrms) of country i with j in
period t−1. Let us assume that all varieties in country i and period t are pro-
duced by using one factor of production, labor, at unit input costs of witait,
where wit denotes the wage rate and ait the corresponding input coeﬃcient
(inverse labor or total factor productivity). Then, monopolistic competition




where σ > 1 is the (time-invariant) elasticity of substitution between va-
rieties. An important consequence of the assumption of homogeneous tech-
nologies within countries is that, through (1), all ﬁrms in country i – of which
there is a mass nit in period t – behave in the same way so that we can write
3Notice that the chosen approach follows closely Krugman’s (1979) and Redding and
Venables’ (2004) framework. Alternatively, one could allow for heterogeneous ﬁrms by
assuming a ﬁxed distribution of total factor productivity as in Melitz (2003) or Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). The latter approach would support comparative static
results for trade costs which run through an additional channel, namely adjustment of
the export market-speciﬁc lower cutoﬀ level of productivity of active producers. While
the latter may be important to consider for an analysis at the level of ﬁrms or individ-
ual sectors (see Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007; Kee and Krishna, 2008; Cherkashin,
Demidova, Kee, and Krishna, 2009; for examples), selection-induced productivity eﬀects
tend to be negligible in estimated general equilibrium models at the aggregate (country)
level (see Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011). Therefore, we suppress the less
parsimonious outline for a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms, here.
6utility-maximizing demand in j for an i-borne variety in period t, cijt, and














where pijt ≥ pit is the consumer price per unit of cijt, Yjt is income (GDP)
in country j in that period, and Vijt is an indicator variable which is unity,
if i-borne varieties are sold at market j in t and zero otherwise.
Each variety is assumed to be internationally tradable, but importing
is subject to variable transportation costs. With variable iceberg-type trade
costs for shipping goods from i to j in period t of τijt−1 ≥ 0, pijt = pitτijt. We
will assume below that τijt also includes tariﬀs. However, there is no need
to disentangle iceberg from policy trade costs in τijt at this point. Notice
that pijt applies to exports which are measured inclusive of cost, insurance,
and freight. Moreover, we follow Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008) in assuming that a ﬁrm’s proﬁts are additively separable
into export-market-speciﬁc proﬁts. Accessing a particular export market j
for i-borne ﬁrms in period t is associated with ﬁxed sunk costs (incurred in
the ﬁrst year of entry of that export market) plus ﬁxed period-speciﬁc costs.
Suppose i-borne ﬁrms did not deliver goods to market j in period t − 1
but they start doing so in period t. Let us denote the sum of set-up and
maintenance ﬁxed costs per i-borne ﬁrm for serving market j for the ﬁrst
time in t by witfijt, where fijt measures the units of labor used for set-up
and maintenance.4 To capture path dependence through, e.g., generation
4To avoid complicated dynamics at the ﬁrm level which are not observable in aggregate
data for multiple countries, we assume that each ﬁrm lives one period only (see Cherkashin,
Demidova, Kee, and Krishna, 2009, for a similar assumption). However, there is a dynamic
process of aggregate market entry in each period accruing to new ﬁrms’ inheritance of
public knowledge about exports markets from previous periods by previous exporters.
7of information about a market as a public good for ﬁrms from the same
exporting country, in a very parsimonious way, assume that prior exporting
(in t−1) of any i-borne ﬁrms to that market results in proportionately lower
ﬁxed costs of witfijte−δ with δ ≥ 0 (see Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003, for an
early argument along those lines). Then, ﬁxed costs of i-borne ﬁrms from
serving market j in year t may be written as witfijte−δVij,t−1, where Vij,t−1 = 1
if market j had been served by i-borne ﬁrms in the previous period and zero
else. Most importantly, the presence of e−δVij,t−1 in the ﬁxed costs entails
state-dependence in export status at the country-pair level.5
In equilibrium, for positive exports bilateral shipments per variety, xijt,
equal τijt times bilateral demand per variety, cijt. Then, per-ﬁrm shipments
xijt gross of cost, insurance, and freight (cif) and the value of aggregate
bilateral exports gross of cif, Xijt, are determined as






















Denote the aggregate endowment with labor of country i at time t by Lit.












j=1 Vijt (aitxijt) = ait
 J
j=1 Vijtxijt is the amount of labor used for
5It is straightforward to allow for a more ﬂexible cost function with a more general
pattern of path dependence such as witfijte−
PD
d=1 δdVij,t−d. However, in the application
below there is too much multicollinearity across the Vij,t−d so that identiﬁcation of the in-
dividual parameters δd is only possible with D = 1. Hence, we abstain from overburdening







is the amount of labor used for set-up
of business contacts in
 J
j=1 Vijt ≤ J markets.





where Vij,t−1 = 1 if i = j; i.e., we assume that fiit is small enough to ensure
that active ﬁrms always serve consumers at least in the country they produce
in at any period t.6
Non-negative proﬁts in (6) for exports per ﬁrm from i to j in period




ait (σ −1). Hence, i-borne ﬁrms will only start exporting to j in t, if
τijtcijt ≥
fijt
ait (σ − 1) and, in case of prior exports between i and j, they will
only continue exporting, if τijtcijt ≥
fijte−δ
ait (σ−1). No matter of whether they
start or continue exporting in t, at free entry an i-borne ﬁrm’s exports to j
in t are determined by x∗
ijt. In equilibrium, usage of x∗
ijt in (5) determines







Since market j is only served in t by i-borne ﬁrms if this is proﬁtable,
we may introduce a latent variable V ∗
ijt that reﬂects aggregate potentially
6We also assume throughout that the costs of entering foreign countries are low enough
so that it pays oﬀ for ﬁrms to export somewhere abroad and to consumers in every country
to import some varieties, in line with empirical stylized facts. When we estimate the model
to the data, this outcome arises endogenously, consistent with those facts.






























iit ≥ 1 by both assumption and observation (consumption from do-
mestic producers is generally positive at the aggregate level), both V ∗
ijt and
  V ∗









In general equilibrium, total sales to all markets gross of ad-valorem tariﬀs
charged by importers (referred to as including cost, insurance and, freight;
cif) add up to GDP, Yit, plus tariﬀ revenues earned by i minus tariﬀ revenues
collected abroad from i’s exports, Tit, so that
















or, after deﬁning Yt ≡
 J










θht, similar to Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) and Anderson (2010), we obtain






it = ˘ θitΠ
σ−1
it . (11)
The latter expressions illustrate that the adopted version of a Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) or Krugman (1979) model is isomorphic to the one of Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003). Replacing nitp
1−σ
it by the expression in (11) and Yjt
10by Ytθjt in (4) and recalling the deﬁnition of P
1−σ
jt from (2), the generalized
system of trade resistance equations ` a la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)



















ht ˘ θh. (12)
Deﬁning µit ≡ ˘ θitΠ
σ−1
it and mjt ≡ θjtP
σ−1
jt , we can rewrite aggregate nominal
exports at cif from i to j in t as
Xijt = Ytτ
1−σ
ijt Vijtµitmjt, with (13)











A key assumption in the paper is that ﬁrms consider the role of path
dependence for market entry, but they do not look forward and equate the
stream of future operating proﬁts to the one of total (per-period and subse-
quently sunk entry) ﬁxed costs when deciding about the timing of entry. In a
separate paper, we analyze a model of the latter kind in general equilibrium.
It turns out that when conditioning on observed fundamental variables, un-
der certain assumptions, the estimation part of the problem is not much
diﬀerent from the problem with path dependence: while past export status
exhibits a constant eﬀect δ on the latent process determining the extensive
margin here, it has a drift of the form δ   t, where t represents a time trend.
However, counterfactual analysis is computationally extremely demanding
with forward-looking managers and there are so many conceptual problems
involved that this issue calls for a separate paper focusing on counterfactual
analysis rather than estimation.
113 From theory to an empirical model: Imple-
mentation and estimation
To derive an econometric speciﬁcation of the above gravity model with panel
data, we need to specify the stochastic processes that arise from measurement
error about or random shocks on exports. Finally, we ought to comment on
some issues with the implementation of the model.
3.1 Adding disturbances
Let us take logs of the gravity equation in (13) and add a log-additive sto-







ijt + lnmit + lnµjt + uX,ijt if Vijt = 1
unobserved if Vijt = 0
, (15)
where uX,ijt is the stochastic disturbance term. The trade resistance terms
lnµit and lnmjt are determined as implicit solutions to the system of 2J
equations (14) in 2J unknowns µit and mjt for each period t following from
the requirement of multilaterally balanced trade for each economy.
The unobserved latent variable for the propensity to export from i to
j in year t based on (9) is log-transformed, augmented additively by the








the expression can be written as












+ δVij,−1 + ln
fiit
fijt
+ uV,ijt, with (16)
Vijt = 1[ln   V
∗
ijt ≥ 0]. (17)
We will talk about the assumptions regarding uX,ijt and uV,ijt in the next
12subsection. With respect to variable trade costs and ﬁxed export market ac-
cess costs, our speciﬁcation follows the literature (see, e.g., Helpman, Melitz,










where ζk,ijt and χl,ijt are variables related to variable and ﬁxed trade costs,
respectively. In practice, K may equal L and all factors determining lnτ
1−σ
ijt
may also aﬀect lnfijt. As long as the parameters αk diﬀer from the respective
βl, lnτ
1−σ
ijt may still diﬀer from lnfijt, even if lnζk,ijt = lnχl,ijt for k = l.
It may be desirable for identiﬁcation to include at least one other element
lnχl,ijt beyond the ones of lnζk,ijt in small samples, but in large samples as
ours, there is no need for the fundamentals behind lnτ
1−σ
ijt and lnfijt to diﬀer
at all.
Obviously, even in the absence of zero trade ﬂows (i.e., Vijt = 1 for all
ijt) and at known σ, Yit, τ
1−σ
ijt , the system in equation (14) could only be
solved numerically.7 Notice that we fully respect cross-equation restrictions
of parameters in the empirical models (15)-(17).
3.2 Stochastic process and estimation
The actual implementation of the above model rests upon equations (15)-
(17). Notice that export status at the country-pair level, Vijt, is observed at
any point in time t, but the underlying latent processes ln   V ∗
ijt or ln     V
∗
ijt are
7Baier and Bergstrand (2009) derived a linear approximation of the system of multi-
lateral trade resistance terms (in the chosen notation Πi and Pj) which is based on the
ﬁrst step of a Gauss-Newton iteration of the solution to the system of trade resistance
equations (14). In Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2010), we generalize this procedure to the case
with some zero trade ﬂows. However, we illustrate that this approximation does not work
well due to discontinuities in the objective function.
13not. The latter latent variables measure the net log beneﬁts from exporting
at all from i to j at time t. Hence, Vijt measures and   V ∗
ijt determines what we
may refer to as the extensive margin of exports at the aggregate country-pair
level. The variable lnXijt is only observed if ln   V ∗
ijt > 0 and operating proﬁts
earned in country j are large enough to cover the ﬁxed exporting (or export
market access) costs.
The disturbances uV,ijt and uX,ijt in the models of   V ∗
ijt in (16) and lnXijt
in (15), respectively, are speciﬁed as
uV,ijt = ηV,ij + λV 0Vij,0 + εV,ijt (19)
uX,ijt = ηX,ij + εX,ijt, (20)
where ηV,ij and ηX,ij are time-invariant, country-pair-speciﬁc eﬀects that are
assumed to be uncorrelated with the other determinants of   V ∗
ijt (including
Vij,0) and of lnXijt, respectively. ηV,ij and ηX,ij are identically and indepen-
dently distributed normal random eﬀects which may be correlated with each
other, and λV 0 captures the (time-invariant) initial conditions, which are in-
cluded to acknowledge the market entry dynamics introduced before. More-
over, εV,ijt and εX,ijt are identically and independently distributed normal
disturbances which may be correlated with each other but are independent
of ηV,ij and ηX,ij and the other determinants of   V ∗
ijt (including Vij,0) and of
lnXijt.8
8In principal, it would be possible to allow not only uV,ijt (as we do) but even ηV,ij to be
correlated with some of the determinants of   V ∗
ijt and ηX,ij with some of the determinants
of lnXijt. For instance, one could follow the so-called Mundlak-Chamberlain-Wooldridge
device and include means of all determinants of   V ∗
ijt and lnXijt in the respective equations
across time in addition to the original variables in the model. However, as this requires
enough time variation in the explanatory variables, that approach is infeasible with numer-
ous time-invariant covariates (such as bilateral distance or common borders, etc.) whose
coeﬃcient estimates are vital to the counterfactual analysis of the model. Accordingly, we
have to resort to the somewhat stronger assumption of ηV,ij and ηX,ij as well as εV,ijt and
14Regarding the distribution of the disturbances, we assume speciﬁcally















Since the variance of εV,ijt, the remainder disturbances in the extensive mar-
gin model, is not identiﬁed, we normalize it to unity without loss of generality
(see the upper left cell of Vε). In that model, ρη  = 0 and/or ρε  = 0 implies
selection into export status, so that the stochastic process may be termed
a generalized random eﬀects sample selection model which allows for path-
dependent aggregate bilateral export status.
For the sake of simplicity of the notation, let us collect the determinants
of the indicator function Vijt (the extensive margin of aggregate bilateral
exports) and of continuous lnXijt (the intensive margin of aggregate bilateral















where Vij,0 is included by following Wooldridge (2005) in wV,ijt to model the
initial condition of the dynamic process for the extensive margin (selection
into export markets), and a constant is included at the end of both wV,ijt
and wX,ijt for proper centering of the data. Taking into account the parame-
trization in (18), the parameter vectors corresponding to wV,ijt and wX,ijt,
εX,ijt to be generally uncorrelated with other determinants of the extensive and the in-
tensive margin of exports. Moreover, the ﬁndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest
that, e.g., the endogeneity of trade regionalism is much less an issue in panel data models
than in cross-section models.
15respectively, are
βV = [α1,...,αK,1,δ,β1,...,βL,λV 0,β0] (21)
βX = [α1,...,αK,1,1,1,α0], (22)
where β0 and α0 are the coeﬃcients of the constants in the two models.





in the speciﬁcation of the latent process (16) underlying the extensive margin
of aggregate bilateral trade have to equal the ones on ζ1,ijt,...,lnζK,ijt in the
speciﬁcation of the intensive margin of exports (15). Moreover, general-
equilibrium-consistent counterfactual analysis requires that the coeﬃcients
on
mjt
mit in (16) as well as the ones on lnµit, lnmjt, and Yt in (15) are unity
each.
Then, we can write the models to be estimated as follows:
Vijt = 1[ln   V
∗
ijt = wV,ijtβV + ηV ij + εV,ijt > 0] (23)
= 1[Aijt + ηV ij + εV,ijt > 0]
lnXijt = wX,ijtβX + ηXij + εX,ijt (24)
= Bijt + ηXij + εX,ijt.
Recently, Raymond, Mohnen, Palm and Schim van der Loeﬀ (2007, 2010) an-
alyzed such models which allow to test and correct for sample selection with
a dynamic process.9 Following Wooldridge (2005) and Raymond, Mohnen,
Palm, and Schim van der Loeﬀ (2007, 2010), we specify the likelihood of
9In contrast to sample selection models for panel data as, e.g., in Wooldridge (1995),
this model permits accounting for state dependence in the selection equation for the exten-
sive margin of exports. Unlike previously applied selection models for structural gravity
equations, this model is applicable with panel data and allows entertaining the time vari-
ation in trade with path dependence at the extensive margin.
16country-pair ij, starting in t = 1 conditional on the regressors in wV,ijt
(including the initial conditions) and wX,ijt and integrate out the country-






























  Vijt 
, (26)
where φ(ηV,ij,ηX,ij) denotes the density of the bivariate normal of the random
country-pair eﬀects as deﬁned above, and Φ( ) and φ( ) in the expression for
Lijt denote the cumulative distribution function and the density, respectively,
of the univariate normal distribution.
The likelihood in (25)-(26) can be numerically maximized to estimate the
model parameters – namely the elements in wV,ijt and wX,ijt as well as those
in Vη and Vε – using a two-step Gauss-Hermite quadrature for integrating
out the random country-pair eﬀects (see Appendix 1 for details). For this,
one chooses a (not too large) number of sample points. The procedure is
computationally demanding, since, with a bivariate normal, the number of
sample points implies a number of evaluation points of that number squared.
We use 49 evaluation points of the Hermite polynomial and a weight for each
of them to approximate the density of the bivariate normal distribution in
the likelihood function (see Appendix 1 for further details).10
Since (5) for observation ijt depends on lnµit, lnmit, and lnmjt which
themselves depend on the estimated model parameter estimates, we pursue
an iterative approach to parameter estimation and solving for lnµit, lnmit,
10Hence, with seven sample points and a bivariate normal, there are 49 points at which
the likelihood has to be evaluated iteratively.
17and, lnmjt for all ijt. Hence, at each iteration step of the likelihood optimiza-
tion, the multilateral resistance terms are solved iteratively. More precisely,
we use starting values of θit, lnµit, lnmit for all it and jt in Step 1 and opti-
mize (25) to obtain estimates of the elements of βV and βX as well as those
of Vη and Vε. Then, we solve for all lnµit and lnmit from the 2JT equations
in (14) through a Newton procedure in Step 2. With the new values for all
lnµit and lnmit at hand, one obtains new values of the latent variable ln   V ∗
ijt,
etc. We iterate Steps 1 and 2 until convergence to obtain theory-consistent
parameter estimates from maximum likelihood estimation. With the chosen
grid of 49 evaluation points (based on seven sample points) with a bivariate
normal for the stochastic process, parameter estimation of a random eﬀects
model cum dynamic sample selection and endogenous multilateral resistance
terms takes roughly two days on a modern multi-core computer for a data-set
as large as ours.11
Overall, the model accounts for three types of instantaneous eﬀects of
increasing trade costs on bilateral trade ﬂows similar to Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008), or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein
(2008). First, there is a direct eﬀect due to the adjustment at the intensive
margin as in (24) through higher (variable) trade costs on consumer prices
in the destination country. Second, higher (variable as well as ﬁxed) trade
costs, eventually, may lead to zero bilateral trade ﬂows as captured by the
extensive margin relationship in (23). Finally, these direct consequences of
higher trade costs at the extensive and intensive margins cause multilateral
eﬀects through trade by virtue of the price index eﬀects captured by (14).12
11As is demonstrated in Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2010), the gain from estimating a
linearly approximated model ` a la Baier and Bergstrand (2009) is only marginal and comes
at the cost of a potentially high approximation bias of benchmark and counterfactual
predicted outcome variables.
12As said before, by focusing on homogeneous ﬁrms within countries, we rule out eﬀects
18In contrast to previous structural empirical work on bilateral trade ﬂows,
our model generates dynamic eﬀects of changes in trade barriers through
dynamic adjustment at the extensive margin of aggregate bilateral trade. In
our empirical analysis, we aim at ﬂeshing out the instantaneous versus the
long-run eﬀects of changes in country size versus trade costs on the extensive
and intensive margin of trade and, taking general equilibrium feedback eﬀects
and implied parameter constraints in the model fully into account for both
estimation and counterfactual analysis.
4 Data and estimation results
4.1 Data
The panel data-set employed in this paper is based on three-year averages of
bilateral exports among 120 countries in ﬁve periods (see Appendix 2 for a
list of countries by continent): 1992 (t = 0), 1995 (t = 1), 1998 (t = 2), 2001
(t = 3), 2004 (t = 4). We use three-year intervals so as to keep the number
of time periods, T, small enough, since maximum likelihood estimation of
the stochastic model is computationally quite demanding. Both Xijt and Vijt
are based on nominal aggregate bilateral export ﬂows in current US dollars
as published in the United Nations’ COMTRADE database. Figures on
exporter and importer nominal GDP in current US dollars for the respective
years come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Furthermore, we employ three types of trade barriers. First of all, we use
average (trade-weighted) applied bilateral tariﬀs information about which is
of higher trade costs on average productivity of ﬁrms exporting from a given country to
a speciﬁc destination country. However, previous evidence suggests that this eﬀect is of
minor importance in aggregate data (see Egger and Larch, 2010; Egger, Larch, Staub, and
Winkelmann, 2011).
19available from the World Bank’s WITS Database. Since the source data on
weighted tariﬀs exhibit a large number of missing values, we interpolated and
imputed missing tariﬀ data using exogenous predictors (see Appendix 3 for
details). Since such a procedure (and even trade weighting alone) leads to
measurement error, we follow Wansbeek and Meijer (2000, p. 29) by con-
structing indicator variables so as to capture quantiles of the distribution
of tariﬀs. Using a rough approximation of the distribution of measurement
error-prone tariﬀ data, e.g., from trade weighting or imputation, through
discrete variables is a valid alternative to instrumental variables estimation
to reduce measurement error (see Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000). More speciﬁ-
cally, we generate ﬁve indicator variables, which are associated with quintiles
of the imputed tariﬀ levels. We use zero tariﬀ rates (as charged within deep
preferential trade agreements such as customs unions or free trade areas) as
the base which fully captures preferential trade agreement membership. In
this way we are able to obtain a maximum coverage of countries and time pe-
riods, which is a prerequisite for both sample selection model estimation and
solution for endogenous terms µit and mjt in (14) consistent with world trade
general equilibrium. Second, we use trade cost measures which are related to
geographical distance between countries from the Centre d’´ Etudes Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales’ Geographical Database. In particu-
lar, we use bilateral distance (in kilometers) between economies’ economic
centers and an indicator reﬂecting common land borders between countries
from that source. Third, we employ measures of cultural distance in terms
of a common oﬃcial language indicator variable, past colonial relationship,
and a common colonizer indicator variable from that source.
Denote average applied bilateral tariﬀ levels charged by country j on
varieties from i in year t in quintile κ = 2,...,5 by 1 ≥ bκ − 1 ≥ 0. Average
20applied bilateral tariﬀ levels in percent are 100(bκ − 1), and they amount
to 2.96%, 7.07%, 11.62%, and 21.42%, in the second, third, fourth, and
ﬁfth quintile, respectively, of the distribution in the average year t. This
information is important for interpretation of the parameter estimates. We
choose a notation so that ζ2,...,ζ5 (e.g., in Table 4 below) correspond to
quintile indicators for the second to the ﬁfth quintile. Given that tariﬀs in
the lowest quintile are captured by b1 = 1, the estimated coeﬃcients   α2,...,   α5
on the indicators ζ2,...,ζ5 can be interpreted as follows:   ακ = −  σ lnbκ for κ =
2,...,5 so that   σ = −
b ακ
lnbκ. Hence, the model principally permits estimation
of σ.13
– Table 2 –
Table 2 summarizes features of the data on nominal exports in logs GDP,
and the geographical (bilateral distance in logs and a non-contiguity binary
indicator), cultural (binary indicator variables on no common language, no
past colonial relationships between exporter and importer, and the two coun-
tries not having had a common colonizer), and political trade barriers (quin-
tiles for tariﬀ rates).14 While the bloc on the left-hand side of Table 2 provides
information on average levels of these variables over the information period
and their standard deviation, the bloc on the right-hand side provides aver-
age three-year changes for the time-variant subset of variables (i.e., except
for the geographical and cultural indicators).
13However, since there are several levels of κ, the estimates for σ may diﬀer across them
if they are not restricted to be the same. In general, there are various ways of estimating
σ which eventually will give diﬀerent point estimates. See Eaton and Kortum (2002) for
a similar ﬁnding in a static Ricardian model of bilateral trade where what we refer to as
an estimate of σ corresponds to an estimate of comparative advantage.
14We use binary indicators on non-contiguity, absence of a common language, etc., so
that the parameters on these binary elements of lnτ
1−σ
ijt and lnfijt always measure the role
of higher barriers associated with an absence of the respective trade facilitation through
contiguity, common language, etc., on the extensive and intensive country margins of
exports.
21According to Table 2, about 21% of the observations fall into the lowest
and as many into the highest quintile of the tariﬀ distribution (zero tariﬀs),15
while about 20%, 19%, and 19% of the observations fall into the second,
third, and the fourth quintile, respectively. The allocation of observations
across quintiles is not exactly identical to 20% due to characteristics of the
distribution of tariﬀs. In the average three-year period, more than 4% of the
observations enter the lowest quintile of tariﬀs (from wherever) and slightly
more than 1% enter the second quintile. Anyone of the upper three quintiles
looses observations in the average three-year period between 1992 and 2004.
The majority of observations does neither have a common land border or a
common language, nore a common colonizer in the past. More than 60% of
the country-pairs did have positive exports in 1989. In the average period,
about 72% of the country-pairs had positive bilateral exports and about 70%
of the country-pairs saw positive bilateral exports three years earlier.
In terms of the notation in the previous section, we have up to K =
L = 10 elements αk lnζk,ijt for k = 1,...,10 in lnτ
1−σ
ijt and βl lnχl,ijt for
l = 1,...,10 in lnfijt, namely the aforementioned tariﬀ, geographical, and
cultural barriers which determine lnτ
1−σ
ijt and lnfijt, respectively. Recall that
we impose the restriction that the estimate of lnτ
1−σ
ijt is identical between the
extensive (ln   V ∗
ijt) and intensive margin equations (lnXijt), but the inclusion
of lnfijt along with lnτ
1−σ
ijt in the extensive country margin model allows for
identiﬁcation of the parameters βl apart from αk.
15Exports of about 24% of the observations in the sample happen within a preferential
trade agreement.
224.2 Estimation results
In this subsection, we summarize the estimation results of dynamic selection
models for the fully non-linear model as introduced in the previous sections.
In any case, the parameters have to be estimated iteratively, since the mul-
tilateral resistance terms in (14) depend on the endogenous Vijt.
Table 3 summarizes parameter estimates and their standard errors for
three models (labeled A to C) each. In a vertical dimension, the table exhibits
two blocs, where the one at the top refers to the extensive country margin as
in equation (23), and the one at the bottom refers to the intensive country
margin as in equation (24). All models are based on the fully nonlinear model
involving implicit solutions to (14) at every step of the maximum likelihood
estimation.
Models A and B allow the stochastic terms to be correlated across the
extensive and intensive margin models. While Model A assumes bivariate
normality so that dependence can be captured by an inverse Mills’ ratio
as outlined in Section 3.2, Model B is a semi-parametric counterpart. The
latter model replaces the inverse Mills’ ratio in the outcome equation by
a third-order polynomial of the linear prediction of the extensive margin
model (i.e., of ln     V
∗
ijt). Conditional on the polynomial function, the stochastic
terms between the two equations are assumed independent. We suppress
the coeﬃcients of the polynomial function but note that they are jointly
signiﬁcant at one percent with the data at hand. Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008) interpret such a model as to control for both endogenous
selection into export markets and ﬁrm heterogeneity within countries (in our
case, average productivity of ﬁrms in i that serve market j in year t).16 Unlike
16This interpretation involves many more assumptions than homogeneous ﬁrm mod-
els do. For instance, one has to specify the distribution function for ﬁrm productivity
and the boundaries of the support region of possible productivity draws (inter alia, one
23in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), the (here, dynamic) selection
equation and the outcome equation have to be estimated simultaneously
rather than in two steps. Hence, maximum likelihood estimation has to be
carried out iteratively until convergence, since the predictions of the control
function change as the parameters of the models change.
Model C assumes that there is no endogenous selection into the extensive
margin of trade and condition on the indicator Vijt in the intensive margin
outcome model as an exogenous variable. Hence, Vijt in the intensive margin
equation for lnXijt is not treated as a Bernoulli response variable to   V ∗
ijt,
unlike in Models A and B. Accordingly, the parameters of the latent process
  V ∗
ijt are not estimated in these models but the multilateral resistance terms
in (14) are solved by conditioning on the observed contemporaneous bilateral
export status Vijt. We consider Model A to be the preferred reference case,
while the other models are inferior due to assumptions made for counterfac-
tual analysis (Model B) or endogeneity bias (Models C).
Due to the parameter restrictions imposed, the estimates of αk are identi-
cal for all determinants of lnτ
1−σ
ijt in either equation within a model. However,
we assume that the same variables aﬀect lnτ
1−σ
ijt and lnfijt so that K = L
needs to take a stance whether this support region is the same across countries or not;
for instance, identical potential productivity support across all countries is assumed in
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). Moreover, in static models, comparative static
eﬀects tend to be very similar between homogeneous and heterogeneous ﬁrm models when
assuming identical distribution functions and possible productivity support regions across
countries (see Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011). Therefore, we use Model A
for further reference. That model assumes as an approximation that ﬁrms only diﬀer in
terms of productivity across countries but are identical within economies. As Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) admit, controlling for ﬁrm heterogeneity links productiv-
ity of the average ﬁrm in country i which serves consumers in j (here, in year t) to the
propensity to export for the marginal ﬁrm. It does not serve to control for the productivity
of the average ﬁrm active in market i, i.e., the inverse of what we dubbed ait. It is the
latter, which we are primarily interested in, and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008)
admit that ait is proportional to producer prices and, hence, implicitly taken care of in
estimation anyway.
24and lnζk,ijt = lnχl,ijt for all k = l, but αk may diﬀer from βl. For the sake
of brevity, we therefore always report parameter estimates for αk,ijt + βk,ijt
in the extensive margin models, since they refer to the same fundamental
trade cost variables. Moreover, only the extensive margin equation includes
(endogenous) Vij,t−1 and Vij,0 and, hence, delivers parameter estimates for δ
and λV 0, respectively.17
– Table 3 –
For the selection equations, we assess the goodness of ﬁt by Matthew’s
correlation coeﬃcient (MCC). This correlation coeﬃcient is based on a cross
tabulation of Vijt and   Vijt and it is related to the χ2-statistic for a 2 × 2
contingency table by |MCC| =
 
χ2
N , where N is the number of observations.
For log positive export ﬂows at the intensive margin, we measure the goodness
of ﬁt by the correlation between the observed and predicted values. Table
3 shows that for the former, we obtain an MCC of 0.520 and 0.593. With
respect to the latter, the ﬁt is quite similar across all three estimated models,
amounting to 0.744, 0.743 and 0.740 for Models A-C, respectively.18
17As said before, it is sometimes argued that exclusion restrictions have to be made
for identiﬁcation of endogenous selection. Yet, this is only an issue in small samples and
would be irrelevant here. However, in our case the common colonial relationship dummy
may be excluded from the extensive margin model for stochastic reasons and the exclusion
of Vij,t−1 and Vij,0 from the outcome equation is dictated by the model in Section 2.
18We would like to emphasize that the results for Models A and B are quite similar and
even those for Model A and C compare closely. For instance, the correlation coeﬃcient
of ln ˆ µit + ln ˆ mjt between Models A and B 0.982 and the one for Models A and C to
0.996. The high corresponding correlation coeﬃcients suggest that the estimated multi-
lateral resistance terms are quite similar across estimated models. The same holds true
for estimated lnXijt at Vijt = 1 where the correlation coeﬃcient between Models A and B
amounts to 0.977 and the one between Models A and C amounts to 0.997. The correlation
coeﬃcient for the predicted Vijt between Models A and B amounts to 0.932. Vijt is taken
as given in Model C and we know from Table 3 that the correlation coeﬃcients between
observed and predicted Vijt in Models A and B amount to 0.520 and 0.593, respectively.
Obviously, a disadvantage of Model C is that counterfactual experiments may not display
an impact of changes in fundamentals on Vijt, since the latter is ﬁxed to the observed
value which is inconsistent with general equilibrium.
25The estimation results in Table 3 suggest the following conclusions. First,
the positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of previous exporting clearly
points to the importance of dynamics and path dependence at the extensive
margin of bilateral exports. We estimate the impact of knowledge-creation
through ﬁrst market entry for subsequent exporters to that market at a ﬁxed-
cost reduction of about 100   e0.431 − 100 ≃ 53.87%. Hence, dynamic market
entry plays a role beyond contemporaneous (or conditional on) fundamentals
so that static model results would be misleading. The parameter estimates
in the semiparametric selection Model B are comparable to their parametric
counterparts in Model A. Finally, the point estimates and standard errors on
ρη and ρε – i.e., correlation of the disturbances between the processes of   V ∗
ijt
and lnXijt – suggests that contemporaneous export status Vijt should not be
treated as exogenous (as in Model C) but as a Bernoulli response variable
(as in the other models).
Regarding the role of variable trade costs for the extensive and the inten-
sive margin, we ﬁnd that all elements of lnτ
1−σ
ijt display negative parameters
(αk) which are highly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in Model A. Hence,
variable trade barriers of any kind speciﬁed deter both the probability to ex-
port at all for country-pairs and, at Vijt = 1, the volume of bilateral exports.
5 Counterfactual analysis
5.1 Preliminaries
With (5)-(7) and (13)-(14), we can now conduct a counterfactual analysis
of changes in the variables underlying τ
1−σ
ijt and fijt as well as of changes in
factor endowments, Lit, and the inverse of total factor productivity, ait. For
this, note that the level of ait is hard to measure. However, deﬁning real
26output as Υit = nityit, with yit ≡
 J
j xijt, and aggregate tariﬀ income of
country i in year t as Ξit, and using these terms in the deﬁnition of nominal
GDP, Yit = σ


























Hence, while the level of ait is hard to measure, we can measure, for instance,
the change of ait over time,
ai,t+1






(using GDP at constant producer prices) from period












it , we can deﬁne a measure of the equivalent variation
as a measure of welfare change in percent (this is the change of real GDP in
terms of consumer prices, Yit/Pit, in percent) as









19In their model of the determinants of export variety, Feenstra and Kee (2008) allow
total factor productivity to be determined endogenously in a non-linear systems estimation
approach. While we do not consider heterogeneous ﬁrms or responses of total factor pro-
ductivity to endogenous variables, this would be principally possible also with our general
equilibrium model. One could even allow tariﬀ indicators to be endogenous and analyze
a system of equations where only geographical (distance and absence of a common land
border) and cultural trade barriers (absence of a common language, of a past colonial
relationship, or of a common colonizer) along with factor endowments Lit would be ex-
ogenous. However this would push the importance of the adopted structural assumptions
quite far, and we resort to stronger assumptions about exogeneity at the advantage of
simplicity of an already complicated structural empirical general equilibrium model with
path dependence at the extensive margin.
27In general, we calculate changes between baseline and counterfactual equi-
libria based on the estimates of Model A for each experiment.
5.2 Design of experiments
Recall that, by design of our data-set, t = 0 corresponds to the initial year
of 1992, while t = 1,...,4 correspond to 1995,1998,2001,2004. Hence, Vij,t−1
refers to three years prior to the one referred to by t. For the analysis of
the role of fundamental variables to the model on outcome, we will com-
pute equilibria which are based on τ
1−σ
ijt , fijt, Lit, ait, and Vij,t−1 as observed
or estimated from data used for estimation. In general, we will use model
predictions based on such values and parameters for the observation period,
namely the years 1995,1998,2001,2004, as benchmark equilibrium values.
Using estimated parameters from the data and assuming an elasticity of sub-
stitution of σ = 5.74,20 we then consider four counterfactual equilibria for all
countries and country-pairs for those years. To some extent, such an analysis
is related to an impulse-response analysis in empirical macroeconomics. The
four experiments considered are the following.
Freezing bilateral tariﬀs: For this experiment, we change tariﬀ-related
trade costs as captured by the indicator variables for quintiles of tariﬀs,
which Models A-C are based upon, in 1998, 2001, and 2004 so as to
eliminate the experienced tariﬀ change since 1995 from the data. This
20We have derived all impulse-response results for three alternative levels of the elasticity
of substitution, namely σ ∈ {5;7;10}. Since   ακ < 0 and log ad-valorem tariﬀ factors
lnbκ > 0 for all quintiles κ = 2,...,5, our results suggest that   σ > 1 throughout, which is
consistent with the corresponding model assumption. However, there is variation about   σ
across κ = 2,...,5, as expected, and the corresponding point estimates are in the range of
  σ ∈ [4.36,...,6.79]. Since the number of observations in each of the upper four quintiles
is about the same, the average value of   σ ≃ 5.74. The latter seems plausible against the
background of previous work at the aggregate level of bilateral trade (see Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2003; or Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch, 2009). Hence, our estimates are
broadly in line with the assumption of σ = 5.
28leads to counterfactual levels of τ
c1−σ
ijt and fc
ijt which in turn lead to
counterfactual export status V c
ij,t−1 for t − 1 = 2,3, but it leaves Lit
and ait for every year t as observed in the data.
Freezing past export status: For this experiment, we keep Vij,t−1 con-
stant at its level in 1995. Hence, outcome may change only in response
to contemporaneous changes in τ
1−σ
ijt , fijt, Lit, and ait as observed in
the data between 1995 and 2004 for any ijt, but these changes may
not stimulate dynamic adjustment at the extensive country margin of
trade.
Freezing labor endowments: For this experiment, we set Lc
it in each
year after 1995 to the level Li1, which corresponds to 1995. Inter alia,
this leads to changes at the extensive margin so that V c
ij,t−1  = Vij,t−1
in t − 1 = 2,3. All other variables such as τ
1−σ
ijt , fijt, and ait are as
observed for any ijt.
Freezing total factor productivity: For this experiment, we set ac
it to
its level of 1995 in every year after 1995 but let τ
1−σ
ijt , fijt, and Lit
change as observed in the data for any ijt. Again, this will lead to a
change in aggregate bilateral export status so that also V c
ij,t−1  = Vij,t−1
in t − 1 = 2,3.
Then, for each experiment we calculate counterfactual bilateral export
ﬂows (Xc
ijt), GDP (Y c
it), price terms µc
it and mc
jt, endogenous export status
(V c
ijt), and equivalent variation (EV c
it) as described in Appendix 4.
A comparison of the four counterfactuals analyzed with the benchmark
equilibrium for 2004 addresses the role of observed changes in all fundamental
variables involved in our model.
29– Tables 4a and 4b –
Table 4a summarizes average diﬀerences between 2004 and 1995 of   τ1−σ
ijt
and   fijt based on parameter estimates and data. All changes are expressed
in percent of the corresponding levels in 2004. In particular   τ
1−σ
ijt and   fijt
reﬂect weighted changes of tariﬀs according to the associated tariﬀ quintiles
country-pairs belong in. However, total bilateral ﬁxed costs are composed
not only of   fijt but also of e−
b δ
b Vij,t−1 so that it is useful to report changes of
  τ
1−σ
ijt and   fijt along with ones of e−
b δ
b Vij,t−1 and e−
b δ
b Vij,t−1   fijt in Table 4a. In
general, we have grouped countries into four blocs – EFTA members as of
2004,21 EU members as of 2004,22 NAFTA members,23 and a Rest of the
World which consists of the remaining 89 countries our estimates are based
upon (see Appendix 2 for a detailed list). We report changes for average
country-pairs within and across blocs of countries and, underneath those
ﬁgures, standard deviations. This is done to illustrate that there is much
variation both within and across blocs of countries in tariﬀ-related impulses
in variable and ﬁxed trade costs. There are entries in the diagonal elements
because these blocks consist of multiple countries.24
Table 4a points to relatively large diﬀerences in trade and ﬁxed costs
between 2004 and 1995. At ﬁrst glance, it seems surprising that these changes
21European Free Trade Agreement: Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
22European Union: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and
United Kingdom.
23North American Free Trade Agreement: Canada, Mexico, and United States.
24In principal, one could even analyze changes within countries. However, Vii,t−1 = 1
for all ii,t−1, and tariﬀs do not change for intranational trade. That does not mean that
there are no intranational responses to changes in foreign tariﬀs. Changes in intranational
trade in response to bilateral variable or ﬁxed trade costs are indirect responses to changes
abroad. When comparing counterfactual with benchmark equilibria for nominal trade, we
will report intranational and international responses of countries’ outcomes to changes in
fundamentals separately.
30are not smaller for intra-EU relationships than for other blocks. However, we
should bear in mind that we deﬁne the EU as of 2004 so that the ﬁgures in
Table 4a account for the extensive liberalizations between the ten entrants to
the Union in 2004 and the tariﬀ liberalizations between the 15 incumbents
and those entrants even prior to the Union’s enlargement (see Egger and
Larch, 2010). Negative ﬁgures in the upper left panel of Table 4a indicate
that   τ
1−σ
ijt was lower and, hence, trade costs were higher in 1995 than in
2004. For many cells in that panel, the corresponding diﬀerences were in
the double digits in terms of 2004 levels of   τ
1−σ
ijt . In general, the variation
of diﬀerences in   τ
1−σ
ijt within the cells of the panel appears as big as the one
across block-wise averages.
The upper right panel of Table 4a suggests that ﬁxed costs   fijt of export-
ing to a new market were higher in 1995 than in 2004 within and between
most country blocks on average. The average diﬀerence was smaller than
the one in   τ
1−σ
ijt , though. However, the variance in that comparison is bigger
within most cells than the one of averages across cells. Again, there was a
relatively big change for intra-EU25 relationships over the observation pe-
riod. The lower right panel of Table 4a suggests that average ﬁxed bilateral
market entry costs declined more extensively due to dynamic market entry
than they would have without it. To see this, compare the cells in the panel
at the lower right with the corresponding ones at the upper right of Table
4a.
Table 4b summarizes average changes in Lit and ait for country blocs.
Since both Lit and ait are unilateral, there is no need for a bloc-by-bloc de-
composition of the corresponding changes, unlike in Table 4a. Within all
country blocks, the labor force was smaller in 1995 than in 2004 and more
labor input was required to produce one unit of output on average prior
31to 2004. Estimated changes in technology between the reference years were
obviously much larger than ones in labor endowments over the considered
decade. As in Table 4a, the standard deviation of changes is meant to pro-
vide information about the variation of diﬀerences between benchmark and
counterfactual values – i.e., of impulses within blocs at the end of the obser-
vation period.
Since there is large variation in the impulses across countries, country-
pairs, and blocs thereof, we will also report averages and standard devia-
tions of outcome responses across blocs below. The latter will not only vary
through the heterogeneity of changes but also through the heterogeneity of
levels of these variables in 1995.
Of course, since the model at stake is highly nonlinear, the total change
in predicted outcome is not linearly separable into the ones contributed by
the four fundamental variables. However, the magnitudes of the responses of
outcome to the associated changes will shed light on the relative importance





b Vij,t−1, Lit, ait, and inertia at the extensive country margin of
trade,   Vij,t−1.
5.3 Counterfactual versus benchmark equilibria
In Tables 5-8, we summarize the associated responses to the accumulated
shocks described in Tables 4a and 4b on outcomes of interest. In particular,
such outcomes are nominal bilateral ﬂows at the extensive as well as the
intensive country margins, Xijt (see Table 5),25 nominal trade ﬂows at the
25At the level of country-pairs, Xijt may be zero in the benchmark equilibrium, the
counterfactual equilibrium, in neither situation or under either circumstance. We avoid
loosing observations which entailed a change at the extensive country-pair margin of trade
by aggregating total exports up by country block and then computing percentage changes
after aggregating. We do not report the standard deviation of changes within blocks in
32intensive country-pair margin only, i.e., Xijt at given Xijt > 0 in both the
benchmark and the counterfactual equilibria (see Table 6), endogenous ex-
port status as a binary measure of the extensive country-pair margin of trade
only, Vijt (see Table 7), intra-national nominal sales, Xiit (see Table 8), the
equivalent variation, EVit (see Table 8), and the number of ﬁrms active, nit
(see Table 8). We do so for an elasticity of substitution of σ = 5.74, which is
consistent with the data. Akin to the change in τ
1−σ
ijt and fijt, Lit, and ait, all
counterfactual equilibria are expressed as percentage changes relative to the
benchmark equilibrium as of 2004. However, notice that outcomes in 2004
are informed by and depend on the history since 1995 (and the one before
that). For the counterfactual equilibrium in 2004, it matters not only that
but also when changes in fundamentals and associated responses happen.
– Tables 5-8 –
The ﬁgures in Table 5 suggest that, across the board, technological change
and the changes in trade and ﬁxed costs together were the most important
drivers of aggregate nominal bilateral exports. There were signiﬁcant im-
pulses in trade and ﬁxed costs and, consequently, sizable responses of intra-
EU and EU-EFTA trade. Those accrued to the liberalization of tariﬀs with
the entrants to the EU via-` a-vis the EU incumbents as well as the EFTA
countries and also other blocks. Notice that we compare counterfactuals
with higher trade and ﬁxed costs to benchmark ones with lower such costs.
Hence, the upper left panel of Table 5 should be interpreted as to illustrate
that the experienced reduction in tariﬀs led to large positive responses of
nominal block-wise trade until 2004. The table suggests that technological
progress was relatively more important than trade and ﬁxed cost changes
that case to avoid dropping zeros.
33that on average. This is not to say that (ad-valorem and ﬁxed) trade costs
are less important than technology as such. It rather means that the blunt
tariﬀ liberalization impulse in an already relatively liberalized world as of
1995 did not cause further strong responses of trade ﬂows. In other words,
the lion’s share of tariﬀ liberalizations occurred at times prior to our sam-
ple period – when information about applied tariﬀs was even scarcer than
from 1995 onwards. Technological improvements appear to have had a much
stronger impact at given liberalization than tariﬀ changes did.26
Similar to Table 5, Table 6 reports responses of predicted changes in trade
ﬂows between 1995 and 2004 in a counterfactual conﬁguration of fundamental
variables and the one in a benchmark conﬁguration over the observation
period. Yet, in contrast to Table 5, we now focus on changes at the intensive
country margin so that Vijt = 1 is required in both the benchmark and
the counterfactual equilibrium before aggregating trade ﬂows and computing
changes thereof per block. This allows us to report not only average block-
wise changes but also the standard deviation in responses across the country-
pairs behind each cell of the four panels in Table 6. Similar to changes in
total aggregate trade in Table 5, where Vijt could have been zero in either the
counterfactual or the benchmark equilibrium, the estimated change in total
factor productivity between 1995 and 2004 appears to have had the largest
eﬀect on nominal trade among the considered experiments. On average, trade
among previously trading economies within and across country blocks would
have grown by more than 20 percent less during the observation period, if
technology had stayed constant after 1995 (see Table 6). The corresponding
eﬀect was particularly large within the EU25 block where a large fraction
26It may well be that trade itself was an important carrier to technological change, which
lies beyond the possibilities of inference with the structure imposed here (see Feenstra and
Kee, 2008, for evidence along those lines).
34of both the exporters and the importers experienced dramatic productivity
improvements.
The average country-pair in the sample would have seen a growth of trade
at the intensive country margin which would have been slower by more than
12 percent without the growth of the labor force over the same time span
(see Table 6). Not surprisingly, that eﬀect was largest among the 90 ROW
countries in the sample, where Lit changed the most according to Table 4b.
The change in trade costs and ﬁxed costs together exhibited an impact on
the growth of nominal trade ﬂows at the intensive margin which was not
much less important than the one of changing labor force since 1995. The
average country-pair would have seen a growth in trade which would have
been almost 6 percent slower than in the benchmark situation between 1995
and 2004. Both the impulses and the responses were largest for EU-ROW,
EFTA-ROW, and NAFTA-ROW trade. However, even the response of intra-
EU25 trade was quite sizable. According to the lower right panel in Table
6, a lack of dynamic adjustment at the extensive country-pair margin and
its associated impact on ﬁxed costs alone would have led to 3.7 percent less
of growth at the intensive country margin of trade than in the benchmark
equilibrium. For that eﬀect, it matters where and when changes in economic
fundamentals such as trade and ﬁxed costs, labor endowments, or technology
occur.
A comparison of Tables 5 and 6 suggests where most of the changes at
the extensive margin occurred. Table 7 considers this diﬀerence explicitly by
focusing on changes in Vijt rather than the diﬀerence between Tables 5 and 6
as such. The latter is interesting, but it is even more so in combination with
Table 7, since changes at the extensive country margin may be composed of
minor changes in the number of trading relationships but big jumps in values
35of trade or vice versa.27
Table 7 suggests, as expected, that a change in neither of the funda-
mental factors considered had a big impact on the extensive country margin
of trade within or across EFTA, EU, and NAFTA. This is not surprising,
since most of the countries maintained bilateral trade relations in the bench-
mark equilibria, and even the sizable impulses in fundamentals were not big
enough to change that much. However, some of the impulses were as big in
the ROW bloc, within and with which most of the existing zero trade ﬂows
in aggregate bilateral trade matrices occurred in the data. The extensive
binary country margin of trade increased on average by about 6 percentage
points in the average three-year interval between 1995 and 2004, according
to Table 2. This change was mostly due to changes of relationships with
or of the ROW. According to the upper left panel of the table, that change
was mainly induced by a reduction in trade and ﬁxed market entry costs.
Growth of the labor force had a qualitatively similar but quantitatively less
important eﬀect. If anything, technology growth and market entry dynamics
cushioned the stimulus of trade and ﬁxed costs as well as population growth
on the extensive country margin of trade with the ROW.28
Table 8 summarizes responses to the impulses in Tables 4a and 4b of
three further outcomes: intra-national sales (or “trade”, Xiit) for the average
country in a block;29 the change in the number of ﬁrms active;30 and the
27This is also the case for other extensive margins of trade such as the extensive product
margin analyzed in Feenstra and Kee (2008) or Kehoe and Ruhl (2009).
28Recall that, due to the nonlinearity of the model, we may not simply add up the
changes in the four panels to arrive at the total predicted change of Vijt. The proposed
structural model predicts both average levels and average changes well. This suggests that
changes in trade and ﬁxed costs interact with changes in the labor force in a way so that
the joint impact is signiﬁcantly larger than the sum of te individual impacts.
29Since domestic sales are never zero, it suﬃces to consider Xiit without any distinction
of the extensive and the intensive country margin, there.
30The latter is an aggregate, single-sector counterpart to the multi-sector analysis in
Broda and Weinstein (2006), Feenstra and Kee (2008), or Kehoe and Ruhl (2009). How-
36equivalent variation, which corresponds to the diﬀerences in the change of
real GDP between an unobserved counterfactual conﬁguration of economic
fundamentals and the predicted benchmark.
The ﬁrst panel in Table 8 pertains to nominal intra-national goods trade
which is interesting to compare either to the diagonal or the row sum entries
of the respective impulse-speciﬁc panels in Tables 5 or 6. Not surprisingly,
changes in trade and ﬁxed costs had a smaller impact on intra-national than
on international trade. The reason is that such changes have direct eﬀects
only on transactions with foreign consumers. Hence, all the eﬀects on nom-
inal intra-national sales are indirect in scope. Notice also that responses
diﬀer qualitatively in our model or others allowing for changes at the ex-
tensive country margin of trade as captured by Vijt (see Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein, 2008) from standard Krugman-type models. The reason is
that trade costs aﬀect real aggregate output, real output of the average ﬁrm,
as well as the number of ﬁrms active, here. This is fundamentally diﬀerent
from models in the vein of Krugman (1979), Anderson (1979), or Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) where aggregate real output is independent of (ad
valorem) trade costs. Partly for reasons of real eﬀects of trade costs, average
block-wise responses in intra-national sales tend to have the same sign as the
responses of international sales (exports) in Tables 5 and 6. Moreover, eﬀects
on intranational sales are qualitatively similar to the ones on international
trade, since eﬀects on wages or mill prices aﬀect either outcome in a similar
way.
Had trade costs and ﬁxed costs not declined, or the labor force, or tech-
nology, or the number of markets served per country not increased since
1995, then ﬁrm numbers would have grown slower (or even have declined)
ever, unlike there it is inﬂuenced by a dynamic process about ﬁxed costs and market entry
at the country margin consistent with general equilibrium in the proposed model.
37in response.31 In other words, the decline in trade and ﬁxed costs and the
expansion of the labor force, technological progress, and aggregate export
market entry have each in isolation contributed to faster growth of the num-
ber of ﬁrms in the average country. This can be seen from the second panel
in Table 8. Among those, market entry dynamics and the growth of the labor
force were of the most and of about equal importance for the average coun-
try and country block. In particular, export market entry at the extensive
country margin and the associated depression of ﬁxed market service costs
contributed to much growth of ﬁrm numbers in both the ROW as well as
the EU as of 2004. The stimuli on ﬁrm numbers were biggest in the ROW,
NAFTA, and EFTA. Trade and ﬁxed cost reductions exhibited their biggest
impact on the growth of ﬁrm numbers in the EU and ROW. Technological
progress was of minor importance for the entry of ﬁrms or export market
entry but was obviously more important for output per ﬁrm (ﬁrm size).32
The last panel of results in Table 8 suggests that reductions in trade and
ﬁxed costs since 1995 together had a relatively small welfare-enhancing im-
pact, irrespective of which country block we look at. However, there was
a big variation about that magnitude among the 90 countries in the ROW.
The ﬁgures in the other columns suggest that dynamic adjustment at the
extensive country margin, growth of the labor force and, in particular, tech-
nology improvements entailed much bigger stimuli for the growth of trade
than trade and ﬁxed costs. Had technological progress taken place in isola-
tion, the average economy would have grown slower by more than 18 percent
31This is true on average with the model, estimates, and data at hand. Yet, the reduction
in trade and ﬁxed costs alone even triggered negative eﬀects on intranational sales in the
EU.
32To see this, consider the relatively large eﬀects of technological progress on welfare in
Table 8 and nominal trade ﬂows in Tables 5-6 and contrast them with its small impact on
market entry in Table 7 and ﬁrm numbers in Table 8.
38(or roughly 1.8 percent per annum) over the last decade. Dynamic adjust-
ment at the extensive margin (which is associated with lower ﬁxed costs)
explains a welfare change of about one-tenth of that magnitude on average.
The realized growth of the labor force appears to have been about one-third
less important for trade than technological progress was. Notice that the
welfare eﬀects reported in Table 8 are accumulated eﬀects which depend not
only on the diﬀerence in fundamentals between 1995 and 2004 but also the
spacing of the associated diﬀerence in time. Since responses take time to
accumulate, simple inference about welfare eﬀects in static models as sug-
gested by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) is not possible in
a dynamic setting as this one.
5.4 Impulse-response functions for average welfare and
the intensive margin of trade
In Tables 5-8, we summarized responses of outcome to shocks in fundamentals
by considering only the year 2004 for the comparison of counterfactual and
benchmark equilibria. In part, these responses consisted of accumulated con-
temporaneous responses and ampliﬁed eﬀects through dynamic adjustment
at the extensive margin. It is the purpose of this subsection to disentangle
accumulated immediate (contemporaneous) responses from the ampliﬁcation
eﬀect accruing to dynamic adjustment through path dependence at the ex-
tensive country margin of trade. By such an analysis, we aim at disentangling
dynamic from static gains from trade.
– Figure 1 –
In Figure 1, we display changes in response to impulses on the four fun-
damental variables across the four years 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004. For the
39sake of brevity, we consider responses of the average country or country-pair
in a period and over time. In general, one source of a dynamic pattern in
responses is time pattern of impulses, and the other one is sluggish adjust-
ment of outcome, in particular, at the extensive margin of exports. We aim
at disentangling the two by displaying the total response by a blue line and
the immediate response without dynamics by a red line in the ﬁgure.
Figure 1 contains six panels: three of them pertain to a response in
equivalent variation (at the top; compare to the bottom panel of Table 8)
and three to the intensive country margin of nominal bilateral exports (at
the bottom; compare to Table 6). In a horizontal dimension, we report
responses to alternative impulses: keeping trade and ﬁxed costs (left), labor
endowments (center), and labor input coeﬃcients (labor productivity; right)
constant at their levels in 1995 for all countries and country-pairs. In all
panels, we consider responses of outcome between 1995 to 2007 to changes
in fundamentals between 1995 and 2004 (i.e., there is one period outside of
the sample period).
The six panels suggest that dynamic adjustment at the extensive country
margin dampens the detrimental eﬀects of shocks for the average country
(with equivalent variation) or country pair (with nominal exports at the in-
tensive country margin). At ﬁrst glance, this seems surprising, since we see
that there is a positive impact of lagged dependent market entry on the prob-
ability of entering in any period. However, notice that the without-dynamics
loci are based on equilibria which do not consider adjustments of Vij,t−1 across
time but enforce immediate adjustment through resource and other general
equilibrium constraints. Hence, Vijt changes but only due to contempora-
neous impulses in economic fundamentals. Ceteris paribus, this reduces the
propensity to enter a randomly drawn new market. However, a contempo-
40raneous detrimental impulse of fundamentals on outcome is cushioned by
sluggish adjustment of Vij,t−1. Some markets would not be served in the
absence of a ﬁxed-cost-reducing eﬀect of path-dependent Vij,t−1. Therefore,
negative shocks of fundamentals will always be moderated by the aggregate
learning eﬀect through Vij,t−1 as an argument of bilateral time-speciﬁc ﬁxed
market entry costs.
Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates that the biggest marginal responses hap-
pened at the beginning and the end of the sample period. The results for
2007 relative to 2004 suggest that path dependence at the extensive country
margin triggers dynamic eﬀects on outcomes such as welfare and nominal
trade.
6 Conclusions
This paper formulates a structural general equilibrium model which involves
adjustment dynamics at the extensive country margin of aggregate bilateral
trade. We postulate that ﬁxed costs of aggregate export market entry depend
on the earlier presence of exporters from the same country in that market.
Reasons for that may be learning or other forms of information exchange,
establishing a public good character for knowledge about bilateral market
access. Unless there are negative shocks or adverse changes in fundamentals,
ﬁrms would then always serve a market if knowledge existed about it.
Otherwise, the model is a large-numbers monopolistic competition version
of the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Krugman (1979). All ﬁrms
in a market are homogeneous, do not segment export markets with respect to
pricing, use labor as the only factor input, and exhibit the same productivity.
While it would be straightforward to allow ﬁrms to be heterogeneous with
41regard to their total factor productivity (e.g., as in Melitz, 2003), previous
work suggests that aggregate quantitative analysis can safely ignore such
heterogeneity. Firms exhibit variable and ﬁxed costs of serving a market,
and proﬁts are linearly separable across countries. Hence, ﬁrms may decide
to stay out of a market if the associated proﬁts do not cover the ﬁxed costs
of doing so without inducing direct eﬀects on their activity in other markets.
Structural estimation of that model rests upon two pillars: a dynamic
panel data discrete choice process for the extensive country margin of ex-
ports which is coupled stochastically and in terms of parameter restrictions
with a panel data model for the intensive country margin of exports; and
a nonlinear process of for multilateral trade balance (through multilateral
trade resistance) which depends on the endogenous extensive country mar-
gin of trade. We estimate parametric and semi-parametric bivariate dynamic
sample selection versions of that model.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, there is clear evidence
of dynamic adjustment at the extensive margin of trade conditional on ob-
servable fundamentals of bilateral trade ﬂows as suggested by the theoretical
model. Second, the structural model points to diﬀerences in the relevance of
four alternative drivers of bilateral trade: trade costs and ﬁxed market entry
costs; labor endowments; labor productivity; and market entry dynamics.
The data suggest that, after 1995, changes in labor input coeﬃcients and
labor endowments were (much) more important drivers of both the extensive
and the intensive margin of trade than contemporaneous trade and ﬁxed cost
changes. Part of the reason of this result are bigger impulses in labor produc-
tivity and endowments relative to changes in tariﬀs. However, there is a lot
of variation in the responses across countries and country-pairs which does
not only accrue to the heterogeneity of impulses in the decade after 1995 but
42also to the heterogeneity of country size as well as trade costs and market
entry costs.
The paper sheds light on sizable dynamic gains from trade. Without mar-
ket entry dynamics – i.e., in the absence of dynamic gains to exporters from
knowledge acquisition about foreign market entry – the model predicts that
negative shocks to trade would induce larger time-speciﬁc and accumulated
responses of levels of trade or welfare, irrespective of whether the impulse is
on contemporaneous trade and ﬁxed market entry costs, labor endowments,
or labor productivity. At the extensive margin of bilateral aggregate exports,
market entry dynamics (e.g., knowledge acquisition about foreign markets)
were almost as important as rising productivity on average.
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47Appendix 1. Details on the maximum likeli-
hood estimation procedure
Following Raymond, Mohnen, Palm, and Schim van der Loeﬀ (2007,
2010), the likelihood of country-pair ij at period t, starting in t = 1 and con-
ditional on the regressors in wV,ijt (including the initial conditions) and wX,ijt
is given by terms in (25)-(26). We integrate out the country-pair-speciﬁc ran-
dom eﬀects ηV,ij and ηX,ij using a two-step Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which








where, e−z2 plays the role of the normal density and f(z) is any continu-
ous function of z. wm and am are the weights and abscissas, respectively,
as deﬁned by the Hermite polynomial (see, e.g., Abramovitz and Stegun,
1964), where m indexes to the integration points of which there are M.
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Note that the double integral in (25) is then approximated by a weighted
double summation over all abscissa points ap and am.
48Appendix 2. List of included countries by con-
tinent
Africa (47 countries): Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mo-
rocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra, Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo (United Rep.
of), Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Americas (33 countries): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suri-
name, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Asia (40 countries): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indone-
sia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates,
Viet Nam, Yemen.
Europe (36 countries): Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium and Lux-
embourg, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithua-
49nia, Luxembourg, Macedonia (former Yugoslav Rep. of), Malta, Moldova
(Rep. of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Repub-
lic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.
Paciﬁc (9 countries): Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Papua New
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu.
Appendix 3. Imputation of tariﬀs and con-
struction of tariﬀ quintile indicators
Table 9 summarizes the parameter estimates of the (log-)linear econo-
metric model which we used to impute bilateral log tariﬀ factors, ln(1 +




as a regressor. Usually, one would avoid doing so to prevent an endogene-
ity bias. However, since we are interested in imputation rather than causal
analysis in Table 9, such a procedure is innocuous.
– Table 9 –
Notice that the models we employ in Table 3 are based on 57,120 obser-
vations for which we need tariﬀ quintiles. Average (trade-weighted) applied
bilateral tariﬀ rates are non-missing for 42,537 observations. Hence, 14,583
(about one-quarter) of the bilateral log tariﬀ factors have to be imputed.
The regression in Table 9 is based on a larger number of data-points than
the regressions in Table 3 are. This helps predicting tariﬀ rates in the earlier
years of the sample period the export models are based upon. Some of the
imputed observations use data before and after missing data-points, most of
them are informed by non-missing bilateral tariﬀs in later years of the sam-
ple period. The imputation models work relatively well with a within R2 of
almost 40%.
50We the use the 57,120 observations on partly imputed bilateral log tariﬀ
factors (ln(1+tariﬀ rateijt)) and allot them into quintiles. Finally, we deﬁne
ﬁve binary indicator variables capturing which quintile of ln(1+tariﬀ rateijt)
exports from i to j in year t are associated with. The use of tariﬀ quintiles
rather than actually observed and imputed tariﬀ rates helps reducing the
measurement error (see Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000).
Appendix 4. Solving the fully nonlinear model
in counterfactual equilibrium
Based on known (or estimated) parameters including σ, known counterfactual
GDP shares θc
it and ˘ θc
it, and counterfactual trade barriers (τ
1−σ
it )c and fc
it for
each period, we may solve for counterfactual trade resistance terms from the
































ijt depend on the same variables capturing trade barriers
by assumption. Of course, θc




it) is not observed, but Y c
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where we employed Υit ≡ nityit and yit ≡
 J
j xijt for the baseline scenario
and an analogous deﬁnition for Υc
it. Moreover, we used pit = (µit/nit)
1
1−σ from
(11) and assume throughout that fc
iit = fiit. For estimation, replace estimates
of Vijt by ones of V c
ijt from (27) and Yit by Y c
it from (28) in (14). In particular,
51use   V c
ijt = 1[P(ln     V
c







i =j P(ln     V
c
ijt > 0)] as an
estimate for V c
ijt in (27).
Notice that (14) and (27)-(28) have to be solved simultaneously (or iter-
atively until convergence), since, in counterfactual equilibrium, (14) depends
on (27) and (28) both of which are a function of the multilateral resistance
terms in (14).
The counterfactual analysis requires the prediction of the exporter sta-
tus at the country pair level (Vijt) for both the baseline scenario and the
counterfactual. For constructing a predicted binary indicator ˆ Vijt based on
the continuous     V
∗
ijt, we follow Fosatti (2009) and minimize a cost-weighted
misclassiﬁcation cost function in a grid search to obtain these predictions:
  Vijt = 1 if Φ
 

















1 −   Vijt
 
+ q (1 − Vijt)   Vijt, (30)
where the weights are given by q ∈ [0.535,0.585,0.620.,0.623] for periods
1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004, respectively. These weights are chosen to mini-
mize the diﬀerence in the share of predicted versus observed non-zero exports.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model A Model B Model C
Determinants of bilateral exports
Variables in ln fijt Acronym Param.
   Lowest quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln χ1 + ln ζ1 β1 + α1 Basis Basis -
Basis Basis -
   Second quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln χ2 + ln ζ2 β2 + α2 -0.225 *** -0.273 *** -
0.056 0.056 -
   Third quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln χ3 + ln ζ3 β3 + α3 -0.396 *** -0.486 *** -
0.059 0.059 -
   Fourth quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln χ4 + ln ζ4 β4 + α4 -0.671 *** -0.753 *** -
0.060 0.060 -
   Highest quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln χ5 + ln ζ5 β5 + α5 -0.737 *** -0.786 *** -
0.063 0.063 -
   Log bilateral distance ln χ6 + ln ζ6 β6 + α6 -1.564 *** -1.623 *** -
0.021 0.022 -
   Non-contiguity (binary) ln χ7 + ln ζ7 β7 + α7 -3.297 *** -4.283 *** -
0.575 1.128 -
   No common language (binary) ln χ8 + ln ζ8 β8 + α8 -0.226 *** -0.224 *** -
0.096 0.097 -
   No common colonizer (binary) ln χ9 + ln ζ9 β9 + α9 -0.419 *** -0.571 *** -
0.118 0.111 -
Lagged dependent variable Vij,t-1 δ 0.431 *** 0.390 *** -
0.027 0.027 -
Initial condition Vij,0 λV0 3.656 *** 6.483 *** -
0.068 0.092 -
Goodness of fit 
a) 0.520 0.593
Variables in (1-σ) ln τijt Acronym Param.
   Lowest quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln ζ1 α1 Basis Basis Basis
Basis Basis Basis
   Second quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln ζ2 α2 -0.169 *** 0.002 -0.069 ***
0.026 0.025 0.025
   Third quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln ζ3 α3 -0.425 *** -0.162 *** -0.264 ***
0.028 0.028 0.028
   Fourth quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln ζ4 α4 -0.747 *** -0.407 *** -0.544 ***
0.030 0.030 0.030
   Highest quintile of bilateral tariffs (binary) ln ζ5 α5 -0.849 *** -0.454 *** -0.602 ***
0.032 0.032 0.032
   Log bilateral distance ln ζ6 α6 -1.125 *** -0.963 *** -1.186 ***
0.013 0.018 0.018
   Non-contiguity (binary) ln ζ7 α7 -1.517 *** -1.273 *** -1.141 ***
0.142 0.207 0.163
   No common language (binary) ln ζ8 α8 -0.304 *** -0.059 -0.207 ***
0.049 0.068 0.072
   No colonial relationship (binary) ln ζ9 α9 -2.456 *** -2.315 *** -2.593 ***
0.087 0.169 0.180
   No common colonizer (binary) ln ζ10 α10 -0.674 *** -0.537 *** -0.563 ***
0.063 0.084 0.090
σV,η σV,η 2.982 *** 3.085 *** -
σX,η σX,η 2.601 *** 2.352 *** 2.514 ***
ρη ρη 0.720 *** - -
σX,ε σX,ε 1.135 *** 1.048 *** 1.050 ***
ρε ρε -0.187 *** - -
Goodness of fit 
b) 0.744 0.743 0.740
Table 3 - Regression results for specification variants of the extensive and intensive country margins of bilateral exports
 (Vijt exogenous)
Notes: The estimation includes the data for 1995, 1989, 2001 and 2004 using 1992 as starting values. The total number of
observations is 57,120 out of which exhibits 43,896 strictly positive trade flows. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1, 5
and 10 percent, respectively. Three time dummies are included in  (1-σ) ln τijt, but not reported. 
 (Dep. is Bernoulli response variable Vijt)


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































k(All changes are in percent.)












Table 4b - Average change in labor endowment and input 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































k(All changes are in percent.)
Exporting block Labor (Lit) Input coeff. (ait) Dynamics (Vijt)
EU 1.7 -2.0 -20.9 -2.1
2.7 5.7 12.8 2.9
 
EFTA 0.1 -4.9 -14.6 -1.7
0.7 3.2 8.8 1.3
 
NAFTA 0.0 -7.6 -15.0 -1.1
0.5 4.3 8.1 0.5
 
ROW -0.1 -9.8 -12.1 -4.2
2.0 10.4 13.0 4.5
 
Total 0.2 -8.4 -13.6 -3.7
2.2 10.0 13.2 4.3
Exporting block Labor (Lit) Input coeff. (ait) Dynamics (Vijt)
EU 0.1 -1.8 -1.5 -3.1
3.4 7.2 2.7 8.6
 
EFTA -0.7 -6.9 -2.7 -1.6
2.2 3.0 1.6 1.1
 
NAFTA -1.1 -10.0 -0.5 0.0
0.4 2.0 1.1 1.1
 
ROW 0.3 -13.3 0.4 -12.0
3.5 9.8 3.4 13.8
 
Total 0.2 -10.8 -0.1 -9.6
3.4 10.2 3.3 13.2
Exporting block Labor (Lit) Input coeff. (ait) Dynamics (Vijt)
EU 1.1 -2.3 -26.8 -0.7
2.1 7.6 10.9 2.6
 
EFTA 0.8 -8.4 -19.5 -0.2
2.1 2.9 6.9 0.5
 
NAFTA 0.9 -13.0 -20.8 0.2
1.8 2.1 2.6 0.5
 
ROW -0.3 -16.5 -15.7 -3.3
2.9 11.9 15.9 4.2
 
Total 0.0 -13.4 -18.1 -2.6
2.8 12.3 15.3 4.0
EVit in percent
Response to changes in percent in
Trade and fixed 
costs (τijt, fijt)
Table 8 - Average change in intra-national trade, equivalent variation (EVit), and the number
of firms (nit) in four country blocks (120 countries; 1995-2004)
Change in intra-national sales Xiit in percent
Response to changes in percent in
Trade and fixed 
costs (τijt, fijt)
Response to changes in percent in
Trade and fixed 
costs (τijt, fijt)
Change in nit in percentTable 9   Imputation of missing bilateral ad valorem tariff rates 
Dependent variable is log(1+tariff rateijt) Coef./Std.err.
Importer and time specific average of log(1+tariff rateijt): ъjt  2.567 ***
0.200
ъjt where i and j are neigbours 0.123 ***
0.029








|log(Yjt) log(Yit)| 0.002 ***
0.000
|log(Yit/Lit) log(Yjt/Ljt)| 0.003 ***
0.000
log(Yjt/Ljt) x ъjt  0.019
0.013
log(Yjt) x ъjt  0.048 ***
0.009
log(Yjt/Ljt) x ъjt  0.205 ***
0.006
log(Yit) x ъjt 0.071 ***
0.004




Notes: Constant, exporter fixed effects, importer fixed effects and importer specific
time trends are not reported. Missing observations have been replaced by
predictions from this regression. In a second step 5 dummies are generated that
take the value one if the log(1+tariff rateijt) belongs to quintile k, k=1,...,5. Lastly, all
countries which never report exports or receive imports are skipped both as exporter
and importer. This leaves us with a balanced panel of 120 exporter and importer
countries.   F
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